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We investigate the influence of oil market volatility and hand-picked OPEC
meetings data on herding tendency in the Saudi equity market. Our results
show the presence of significant herding behaviour in the Saudi market; sur-
prisingly this herding behaviour is independent of oil market volatility. Impor-
tantly, we find herding on and around the OPEC meeting days however this is
only limited to a period of high global uncertainty that is, during the Global
Financial Crisis period (GFC) of 2008–2010. However, when we filter out fac-
tor-based herding in the Saudi equities, we also find persistent herding in the
post GFC period. These results are consistent when we assess the impact of
OPEC meetings using event windows of one to 5 days before and after the
announcement. In consideration of the crucial role of OPEC in determining
the oil prices, we explain our results of Saudi market herding on and around
OPEC meeting days for the prior announcement ambiguity and corrections
before, on and after the announcements on global supply. Our results show
that this tendency has originated during the GFC, has persisted in the post-
GFC in the Saudi equities and surprisingly, is largely found absent in the
periods when the Saudi equity market witnessed bullish market conditions.
Our results are robust after accounting for common factor return variations in
equity returns, the unconditional and conditional estimates of the volatility in
oil prices and several event windows around OPEC meeting days.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Herding behaviour refers to investors' tendency to ignore
their information and to follow the market. In herding
markets, asset prices stray from their equilibrium values
and market participants' trading activity drives market
mispricing. As equities depart from fair values, the
increased volatility influences risk-averse investors to
refrain from entering the market. Gains and losses under
such conditions may have serious effects on financial
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institutions and investors. In all, herding tendency is a
subjective investor choice, however, in the context of
developing equity markets such investor behaviour has
the potential to destabilize the financial system, discour-
age investors, imply market manipulation, and reflect
badly on overall market functioning and integrity.
The herding behaviour in a particular financial
market may be triggered by trading activity and/or
information originating from other related markets.
For instance, the study of Galariotis, Rong, and
Spyrou (2015) finds that UK equity market herding
could be initiated by volatility in the US market,
whereas the volatility of UK equities does not instigate
cascades in US markets.1 However, Klein (2013) docu-
ments that this transmission is bidirectional between
the US and European equity markets: volatility in the
European stocks results in herding in the US equity
markets as well.2 The upshot of all this research is
that volatility in one market can instigate herding in
other related markets with crucial implications for
international hedging and diversification.
It is well known that the performance of the Saudi
economy is heavily dependent on oil and therefore, it
would be interesting to see whether uncertainty in the oil
market has any influence on the herding behaviour of
Saudi equities. Hence, this paper aims to investigate the
influence of oil market uncertainty on the herding of
equities in Saudi Arabia. The distinguishing feature of
this study compared to the related literature (See for
instance, Balcilar, Demirer, & Hammoudeh, 2013, 2014;
Balcilar, Demirer, & Ulussever, 2017; Rahman,
Chowdhury, & Sadique, 2015) is that we differentiate
between spurious herding that results from exposures to
the common fundamental risk factors and actual herding
that ignores these factor variations. An additional contri-
bution of this paper is that it investigates the herding
behaviour on and around the OPEC conference meetings
using hand-picked data.
In the oil-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia,
the GDP growth is largely funded by government spend-
ing, which heavily relies on oil revenues.3 An increase in
the oil price triggers economic expansions while price
declines trigger recessions in such economic settings. The
uncertainty in the price of oil casts uncertainty on the
expected future performance of the economy and the
expected cash inflows of operating companies. Poten-
tially, this price variation affect the unsophisticated/
uninformed investors the most and may induce them to
follow the crowd instead of trying to see through the
smoke screens of the changes in fundamentals. Arguably,
this herding is more likely in markets that are dominated
by the less savvy individual investors such as the Saudi
markets.
The volatility spikes in the oil price are not uncom-
mon. During the pronounced oil volatility periods, the
fundamental signals are expected to be unclear for naive
investors and the potential for herding is high. There are
many reasons that cause the oil price to exhibit a rela-
tively higher volatility compared to other financial assets.
The global daily consumption and production of oil are
around 100 million barrels. Each day the world consumes
roughly the same amount of oil that it produces. The nar-
row gap between the demand and the supply makes the
oil price extremely sensitive to news regarding global oil
production and consumption. This also makes the oil
price to fluctuate profoundly during short periods of time.
For instance, in 2018, oil has fluctuated between $85 and
$50 per barrel. The oil price response to the recent supply
shock of the shale oil production technology took the oil
prices from $110 per barrel in May 2014 to $36 per barrel
in January 2016.
The geopolitics, particularly in the Middle East,
threatens energy supplies and influence oil prices.4 Other
examples resulting in outages in global oil supply stem
from embargoes in different forms and shapes: US sanc-
tions on Venezuela and Iran are on-going episodes that
have contributed to oil market returns and volatility in
recent periods. Moreover, interventions by OPEC are
another contributory that introduce fluctuation in the oil
price. To this account, OPEC policy to cut production to
avoid global oversupply until March 2020 is one recent
example.5
On the demand side, the demand for oil depends on
global economic growth. Until recently, the growth pros-
pects of the US and Western Europe used to be the main
source of demand for oil. However, due to the slower eco-
nomic growth in Europe and the US, the main increases
in global demand for oil stem from China, India, the
Middle East and other emerging economies that have
recently started to grow at a relatively higher rate. There-
fore, the growth in these regions plays a pivotal role in
determining the current global demand for oil. The
recovery of oil prices in the aftermath of the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008 was due to the continued growth and
demand coming from these markets. During the period,
the oil price recovered from $50 in January 2009 to $116
by May 2011.
The oil market volatility is not limited to variations in
global supply and demand shocks (Kilian, 2009) but also
reflects the intense speculative activity in the market
(Balcilar et al., 2017). As argued earlier, this uncertainty
in energy prices influences business cycle conditions and
economic prospects of oil-producing countries and its
financial markets. Therefore, it is interesting to see
whether uncertainty in the oil market may instigate vola-
tility and herding in the equity market of an oil-
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producing country such as Saudi Arabia. The existing
research on how herding and volatility in one market
may influence herding in a related market is narrow and
it mainly focuses on the US and the European equity
markets. A notable omission is studied tracing the impact
of OPEC meetings on herding in stock markets. Guidi,
Russell, and Tarbert (2006) document evidence on the
effect of OPEC meetings on the US and the UK stock
markets. However, they do not account for herding
behaviour in these markets. Essentially, we have not
found a study analyzing the herding behaviour in equity
markets, developing or developed, in relation to OPEC
meetings. Thus, our analysis fills an important
research gap.
There is extensive empirical evidence on the informa-
tion transmission from oil to equities,6 but no research
has addressed the question of how oil volatility and
OPEC news influence herding in these markets. In oil-
producing countries, oil market fluctuations are news for
domestic equity market investors and hence the oil mar-
ket is monitored. Oil price hikes are expected to start
business cycles with significant implications on equity
prices and returns. Therefore, it is important to see if
news and volatility in the oil market can start herding in
the equity markets of oil-producing countries. These tests
have implications for global diversification and asset allo-
cation between oil and the equities of oil exporter
countries.
Saudi Arabia is a natural choice to test the proposed
assertions. It is one of the biggest global oil producers,
providing 13% of global oil demand and controls 22% of
the verified global oil reserves. Moreover, the dependence
of Saudi market capitalization on energy is substantial
and this largely explains the information transmission
between Saudi equities and changes in oil prices. The
Saudi equity market is an emerging market and, as such,
is expected to be informationally inefficient and a market
rich with herding.7 Therefore, we aim to investigate two
important questions, first, a novel cross-market informa-
tion transmission that is, whether the oil market volatil-
ity impacts herding in the Saudi equities and second if
the news coming from periodic OPEC meetings influ-
ences herding behaviour. To the best of our knowledge,
this work is the first to assess if herding in a major oil-
producing equity market changes with oil market volatil-
ity and announcements coming out of OPEC meetings.
These empirical exercises will shed light on how the
herding of Saudi equities is associated with different
sources of uncertainty emanating from the oil market.
In the literature, herding behaviour is inferred from
the interaction of the cross-deviation measure of equity
returns with the squared value of the market returns.
The cross-deviation assesses the extent of co-movements
of equities around the average market.8 Where individual
equities in herding markets move alongside the average
market, they do not move by their betas. Instead the cross
dispersion is expected to be negatively and non-linearly
related to the square of market returns. The shrinkage of
the dispersion measure is not a direct measure of herding
but can be interpreted as potential herding.
However, market investors could also take, indepen-
dently and individually, similar investment decisions as a
response to fundamental market information, for exam-
ple, money/portfolio managers may devise their invest-
ment strategies underpinned by same fundamentals.
Hence, observers can see relationships that indicate
herding without actual herding in the markets. There-
fore, precise herding estimates should be inferred and
tested once procedures in the estimation of herding
behaviours have accounted for similar investment styles
and responses to fundamental news in the markets.
Alternatively, market co-movement of similar style inves-
tors may be wrongly construed as herding. Unfortu-
nately, this aspect in prior research has not been
accounted for and this may possibly result in over-
reporting of herding tendency in financial markets by the
reported inferences on herding.
Therefore, before making any inferences about
herding of Saudi equities, we eliminate the part of cross-
section absolute deviations (CSAD), an empirical mea-
sure to approximate herding proposed by Chang et al.
(2000), that is common with and related to fundamental
or style investing. To do this, we subtract the part
explained by the Fama–French–Carhart investment
styles/risk factors from the CSAD. The expectation is that
the relation between squared market returns with the
remaining dispersion is representative of the actual
herding behaviour in the market.9
In the context of Saudi equity herding, we find four
studies: Balcilar et al. (2013, 2014), Rahman et al. (2015),
and Balcilar et al. (2017). Balcilar et al. (2013) and Bal-
cilar et al. (2017) model the CSAD as a Markov switching
process in low, high and extreme volatility regimes while
the Rahman et al. (2015) paper infers, from simple regres-
sion, an expected CSAD that is computed based on a beta
dispersion method. The herding state is modelled as tran-
sitional in the Balcilar et al. (2014) study. All papers find
significant herding, and in Balcilar et al. (2013) herding is
found to be more intense during periods of extreme mar-
ket movements. The Rahman et al. (2015) paper finds
that herding is more intense in an upmarket and when
trading volume is high. Balcilar et al. (2017) go one step
further and investigates the role of speculation in the oil
market on equity herding. It finds that speculation is
associated with more rationality and less herding in the
equity markets of the oil-producing countries.
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Our paper is related to these papers and the rest of
the literature on herding, but our focus on the influence
of oil volatility and OPEC meetings on the herding in
Saudi equities distinguishes this work from earlier
reported evidence. Moreover, unlike the rest of the litera-
ture on herding, we draw inference from the remainder
of deviations after accounting for the covariance risk that
can be explained by the Fama–French–Carhart invest-
ment styles. This provides new perspectives on how
investment style-ridden free herding in the Saudi equities
is related to oil market uncertainty.
Our results indicate that while the non-fundamental
herding in the Saudi equities is significant, the funda-
mental herding is not. This highlights the importance of
filtering style covariation in revealing significant herding
in financial markets. The results are uniform and valid
across all of the time periods investigated.
The similar co-movement of individual equities is
likely to result from herding and imitating rather than
from following similar investment styles and responding
to fundamentals. With the exception of investing in small
companies, the rest of the styles were found to be unprof-
itable during the sample period. The performance of the
value style, the momentum style and the market oriented
style was negative over the sample period. This indicate
that these styles were out of favour and hence, may not
be followed by individual investors in Saudi Arabia.
The herding behaviour of Saudi equities is found to
be independent of the uncertainty in the oil market. This
remains valid even when we examine the relationship
between herding and the oil volatility during the OPEC
conference meeting days or when we use conditional
approximation of oil market volatility. However, we find
that there is significant non-fundamental herding of
Saudi equities on the OPEC conference meeting days
during and after the global financial crisis (GFC) period
(2008–2010). The fundamental herding during the GFC
period is also significant but only at the 10% level. The
Saudi equities co-move during these periods reflect the
influence of the OPEC interventions in the oil market on
the Saudi equities. There is neither fundamental nor non-
fundamental herding on the OPEC conference meeting
days in the pre GFC period.
In the periods that surrounds the OPEC conference
meetings, we find significant non-fundamental herding
in 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 days windows around the OPEC con-
ference meetings. However, the results are insignificant
in the pre GFC period that is, the 2005 to 2008 period.
The herding in the Saudi equities is found significant
during and after the GFC periods that is, 2008–2010 and
2011–2019, respectively.
These results conform to the evidence in Guidi
et al. (2006) that shows that during stressed times oil
markets require more time to incorporate the OPEC deci-
sions. Given the strong influence of variations in oil
prices on the returns in the equity markets of the oil-pro-
ducing countries, the inference also applies to continued
herding behaviour in the Saudi market when interna-
tional markets were stressed/uncertain during/after the
GFC. In the pre-crisis period, herding is insignificant in
the Saudi equity market and vindicates our approach to
approximate herding in the Saudi equities using an
adjusted CSAD measure that is clear of co-movements
coming from Fama–French–Carhart investment styles/
risk factors.
Hence, Saudi equities herd on and around the days of
the OPEC conference meeting particularly during the
GFC period. However, this herding is independent of the
volatility of the oil market. These results can be explained
by the sensitivity of the equity market to the news during
stress, the ambiguity of the outcome of OPEC meetings
during the crisis, and by the expectations that the deci-
sions taken by OPEC will be crucial in determining the
future stability of the oil market over the course of the
GFC. The non-availability of information and resultant
uncertainties may have induced market participants to
copy the market on these days.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
contains a synopsis of the literature on herding. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the methodology. Section 4 contains a
description of the data set and samples. The empirical
findings of the model, the analysis of herding including
the influence of oil market uncertainty can be found in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Herding behaviour in financial markets has been exten-
sively studied. The first group of studies in the subject
infers herding by tracking the changes in equity holdings
and transactions of institutional investors such as mutual
and pension funds. For instance, Wermers (1999) investi-
gates the behaviour of growth-oriented US mutual funds
and finds that they herd in buying /selling small compa-
nies' shares after positive/ negative returns. He also finds
that herding in large-cap shares is less likely. The same
results for US funds are recorded by Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992) and Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1995).
The inference about herding in equities or equity
markets is mainly driven by examining the behaviour of
equities with respect to the average market/industry. The
study of Christie and Huang (1995) uses the cross-sec-
tional standard deviation as a measure to test the
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significance of cascades in US industries during extreme
market movements. The paper finds that US investors in
various industries do not blindly follow other investors
and that herding has no role to play in pricing US assets.
Many other studies find similar results in other devel-
oped equity markets and the US. For example, in a recent
study, Galariotis et al. (2015) find that herding behaviour
is insignificant in both the US and the UK equity
markets.
In Chang et al. (2000) significant herding is found in
many developing and developed markets. Their work
shows that herding behaviour can be inferred if there is a
negative nonlinear relationship between the cross-sec-
tional deviation measure of herding and average market
return. Gleason et al. (2003) use the continuous record of
nine ETFs traded in the US stock market, and they find
that there is an increase in equity return dispersion dur-
ing extreme market moves and thus conclude that there
is no evidence of herding behaviour in the US ETF
markets.
In contrast to the previous studies, Hwang and
Salmon (2004) detect herding using the betas of compa-
nies with respect to the market and/or other risk factors.
Herding in their model occurs when all companies'
returns and market returns are equivalent. This means
that when there is cascading, market betas on all stocks
go to one. This convergence is assumed to depend on
some latent herding parameter that is retrieved using the
Kalman filter. The method also allows for testing return
dispersions net of the components of fundamental factors
and those that are pure market sentiment.
Many researchers think that investors are more likely
to ignore their own information and herd when they are
under stress. Thus, in herding literature, many studies
investigate market behaviour during extreme market
conditions and crises. For instance, Lam and Qiao (2015)
study the Hong Kong equity market and they find signifi-
cant herding evidence during the Asian crisis in 1997, the
Russian crisis in 1998 and the dot com technology bubble
in 2003. Similarly, Prosad et al. (2012) find herding in the
Indian equity market during periods of excess volatility
and stress and no herding in calm periods. Caporale
et al. (2008) provide evidence on herding during periods
of high fluctuations in the Athens Stock Exchange. The
Markov Switching model of Balcilar et al. (2013) shows
that herding is more pronounced during periods of excess
volatility states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries. Finally, Güvercin (2016) finds that there was
significant herding in the Egyptian stock market during
the period of the Egyptian military takeover of the coun-
try by the Army in 2013.
Interestingly, herding is more widespread during
market upturns as opposed to market downturns. The
study of Caporale et al. (2008) of the Athens equity mar-
ket shows that herding is more obvious during market
rallies than in market falls. Lam and Qiao (2015) find
similar results in the Hong Kong stock market as do
Sharma et al. (2015) and Tan, Chiang, Mason, and
Nelling (2008) in the Chinese equity markets. The study
by Houda and Mohammed (2013) shows herding of mar-
ket indexes around the MSCI global index in 35 equity
markets. They show that these markets herd more during
upturns than during downturns.
Information asymmetry is one of the key determi-
nants for herding to take place in financial markets. Sev-
eral studies document that investors in countries with a
lower level of information transparency are more likely
to herd (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; K. A. Kim &
Nofsinger, 2005; Wermers, 1999). Wermers (1999) points
out that herding in the shares of small growth companies
is common due to information asymmetry. Similarly,
Sias (2004) shows that institutional investors in the US
market are more likely to herd buying and selling small
company securities. Other drivers of herding are based
on reputational reasons, style herding and/or fads.
Trueman (1994) suggests that equity analyst herd in mak-
ing their forecasts even at the expense of their private
information. Another form of non-informational herding
may occur if the investors in a particular market are
attracted to the same characteristics of companies, which
promotes herding for different stock characteristics in the
market (Bennett, Sias, & Laura, 2003; Nofsinger &
Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004).
Herding is found to be more pronounced in emerging
markets than in developed markets (Borensztein &
Gelos, 2003). Other studies on developing equity markets
include, Economou, Gavriilidis, Kallinterakis, and
Yordanov (2015) which examine herding in frontier mar-
kets; Chang et al. (2000) and Demirer, Kutan, and
Chen (2010) in Taiwan financial market; Tan et al. (2008)
and Chiang and Zheng (2010)) investigate herding in
Chinese equity markets; and Rahman et al. (2015) and
many other assess herding in the GCC equity markets.10
Our study is related to these studies but we are distin-
guished by accounting for fundamental and style co-
movements in return premia before drawing our infer-
ences on herding in Saudi equities.
Investors in one market can observe price informa-
tion in other markets and hence these investors may
ignore their own information and follow external mar-
kets. In today's increasingly integrated financial markets,
cross herding stands a greater chance. The cross-herding
among markets has been the subject of Galariotis, Rong,
and Spyrou (2015) who focus on herding transmission
between the US and the UK and find that there is
herding spillover from the US to the UK markets but not
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the other way around. Herding in the UK market is
found to be beyond the movement that is required by
fundamental changes in the US markets. In this paper,
we follow Galariotis et al. (2015) to investigate cross
herding from oil to equities to assess the role of oil vola-
tility and information in herding formation in the Saudi
market.
Herding behaviour is predicted in the Saudi market
because, first, the information flows in the less developed
markets such as the Saudi stock exchange are not very
well organized and concentration of information is
assumed to be informationally advantageous for few
investors only. Second, the Saudi market is potentially
dominated by individuals who are driven by emotions
compared to institutional investors. In terms of herding
in the Saudi market, Balcilar et al. (2013, 2014, 2017) and
Rahman et al. (2015) provide important evidence while
using a range of empirical methods.
Rahman et al. (2015) examine the period from 2002 to
2012 and find significant herding in all periods. Balcilar
et al. (2014) use a regime-switching model of volatility
and show that herding is greater and cross dispersions
reduced when the regime switches to the high volatility
state. In their study, the market switching to one with
herding depends on a latent herding parameter that takes
a value between 0 and 1. The conditional mean in their
study controls for many variables, including oil, US inter-
est rates and the VIX index, and all are found to be signif-
icant factors in influencing the herding parameter and
thus the transition to a herding state. Balcilar et al. (2013)
model cross deviations using a regime-switching specifi-
cation and find that oil market movements significantly
influence herding in the Saudi market. Whereas, Balcilar
et al. (2017) investigate herding in the conditional mean
by a Markov State Switching and time-varying parameter.
They link it to the speculation activity in the oil market
and find that oil returns and volatility do not influence
the dynamics of herding in Saudi equities, but specula-
tion in the oil market positively influences herding. Sur-
prisingly, this result implies that high levels of
speculation in the oil market is positively associated with
reduced herding in the Saudi equity market. They explain
that speculation on oil is high when oil is expected to
rally and that this positive news leads to more rationality
and less herding in the Saudi domestic markets.
Our study is related to these studies in assessing the
oil-equity herding relationship. However, our inference is
drawn from the component of the dispersion of equity
returns that remains after accounting for the covariance
from similar investing styles. Therefore, we believe that
our results are purely linked to the market sentiment,
which is the main cause of herding, as opposed to market
moves due to similar but independently taken investment
decisions. We turn now to discuss the methodology that
we follow in our study.
3 | METHODOLOGY
We follow Chang et al. (2000) and regress the cross-sec-
tional absolute deviation of returns on absolute and
squared market returns. Specifically, the dispersion of







jRi,t−Rm,t j , ð1Þ
where Ri, t is the observed return on company i and Rm, t
is the market returns.11 As can be seen, CSAD is a quan-
tity that describes how asset returns tend to rise and fall
with market returns and hence its relationship with the
market returns can capture herding behaviour. When
markets herd, dispersions are predicted to be low
despite a big possible change in the market and this
will be reflected in a negative association between dis-
persion and absolute (squared) returns. However, in
normal conditions company returns are expected to
move with the market according to their betas, and
hence the value of the CSAD should linearly increase
with market returns.12 Chang et al. (2000) argue that
herding violates the linearity of the relationship and
that herding is indicated if the dispersion measure
increases with market returns in a non-linear way at a
decreasing rate. Therefore, a suitable specification that
may be used to detect the herding behaviour in finan-
cial markets can be written as:
CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + et: ð2Þ
A negative and significant β2 is indicative of herding
behaviour in the market.
The influence of volatility transmission from the oil
market on the herding of Saudi equities is checked by
estimating the following regression:
CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3R2o,t + et, ð3Þ
whereR2o,t is the squared returns of WTI crude oil. A neg-
ative and significant β3 coefficient would indicate that oil
volatility is associated with less dispersion and herding in
equity markets.
To check whether investors tend to herd on days
when OPEC meetings are held we use the following
equation:
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CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3DUMtR2m,t + et, ð4aÞ
where DUMt denotes a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 on the days of OPEC members' conference
meetings and zero otherwise. These days are collected
from the quarterly reports issued by OPEC and published
online in the OPEC website. If the Saudi market herds on
these days then the β3 coefficient will be negative and sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels.
Any significant oil volatility influence on the herding
of Saudi equities on the days of OPEC meetings is cap-
tured by the following regression:
CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3DUMtR2o,t + et, ð4bÞ
A negative and significant β3 indicates that the oil
market uncertainty on the days of OPEC conference
meetings may cause herding in the Saudi market.
As the introduction mentioned, spurious herding may
arise as investors may respond similarly to fundamentals.13
In order to filter the part of the CSAD that related to inves-
tor styles we regress it on four risk/style factors as follows:
CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm, t−Rf
 
+ β2HMLt
+ β3SMBt + β4MOMt + et:
ð5Þ
The first three style factors in the model are the Fama
and French (1993) style (risk) factors. The Rm, t − Rf is a
market-oriented investment style which establishes expo-
sure to the general market.14 The HMLt factor is the
return on the portfolio that longs the high book to mar-
ket value stocks and shorts the low book to market com-
panies. The portfolio represents a value investment style.
The SMBt factor is the return on the portfolio that invests
in small companies and sells large ones. The factor is
expected to capture small-cap investment style. The last
factor is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor MOMt,
which represents the return on a portfolio that buys pre-
vious winners and sells previous losers.15The portfolio
mimics the returns of growth investors who follow
momentum strategies.
It is worth to mention here that literature has shown
that these styles have been seen to capture fundamental
information e. For instance, Liew and Vassalou (2000)
find that the HML and SMB factors are informative of
GDP and the economic growth of countries. Similar
results on the positive correlation between growth and
the HML factors are arrived at by Gregory, Harris, and
Michou (2003). Kessler and Scherer (2010) report a sub-
stantial relationship between momentum and the econ-
omy. All these studies provide a justification for using
these styles to filter that part of the CSAD that stems
from investors' similar reactions due to the same funda-
mental information.
The assumption that these factors capture returns on
four prominent and robust stylized investment strategies
is crucial if our analysis is valid and for the decomposi-
tion of the CSAD. On each day, the conditional CSAD on
these factors represents the part of the deviation that
emanates from identical investment strategies or similar
investor responses to the same information filters. The
rest or most of the CSAD can be attributed to pure mar-
ket sentiment and herding. Hence, to find that part of the
CSAD that is likely to be herding we first regress the
CSAD on the styles and then we subtract the actual
CSAD from the fitted CSAD so that the herding measure
is the estimate of the error term in the above equation.
We term this as non-fundamental CSAD
CSADNONFUND,t = et:
The rest of the CSAD is not herding and it is termed
as fundamental and it is estimated as
CSADFUND,t =CSADt−CSADNONFUND,t:
Hence, our actual testing of significant herding in the
previous equations is all based on CSADNONFUND, t and
not on the total CSAD as represented before. Therefore,
we test for significant herding using
CSADNONFUND,t = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + et: ð6Þ
For the influence of oil volatility on herding we
regress
CSADNONFUND,t = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3R2o,t + et: ð7Þ
For the tendency to herd on OPEC meeting days we
estimate
CSADNONFUND,t = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3DUMtR2m,t + et:
ð8aÞ
Finally, for the effect of oil volatility during the days
of the OPEC meetings, we regress
CSADNONFUND,t = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3DUMtR2o,t + et:
ð8bÞ
These tests are estimated over various time periods to
check for significant herding in the Saudi equities and
how it is related to different information channels per-
taining to the oil market.16
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4 | DATA SET AND STYLE FACTOR
CONSTRUCTION
We collect data that includes all listed companies in the
Saudi market from the January 4, 2005 to the September
30, 2019, for a total of 3,845 days. The number of listed
companies by the end of the sample is 175 companies.17
The time series of the corresponding Saudi market index
and the WTI crude oil prices is also retrieved for the same
period.18 All data is obtained in US Dollars from the
Thomson-Reuters DataStream database. The dummy that
represents the days of OPEC meetings during the period
is constructed manually by looking into OPEC quarterly
reports. These are available at the OPEC website: www.
opec.org.
To investigate herding in various time periods the
whole sample is divided into three subsamples. The first
subsample covers the pre-GFC period that extends from
the January 4, 2005 to January 1, 2008 for a total of
781 days. The second is the GFC period but pre-Arab
spring sample and covers the period from the January 2,
2008 to December 17, 2010. It contains 774 days. The
third and final period is the post GFC and Arab Spring
sample that contains 2,291 days and runs from the
December 20, 2010 to September 30, 2019.19
The style factors used to compute the conditional
CSAD and extract the herding dispersion are constructed
by pooling all companies listed in the GCC countries.
The computation of regional factors increases the reliabil-
ity of factors' returns as they will be based on a larger
number of companies operating in an economic block
that is underpinned by similar fundamentals.20
When constructing style factors we include dead
firms in the universe of regional stocks to avoid survivor-
ship bias but we exclude non-common equity companies
and companies with unreported dollar capitalization. Out
of the 623 companies in the sample, 25 non-equity firms
are removed.21
For the remaining companies, we correct for extreme
return reversals in Datastream by setting daily returns for
day t and t + 1 to be missing when the daily return is
more than 100% but reverses the following day. Daily
returns are also considered missing if the return of the
two subsequent days is less than 0.5 and/or the daily
gross return is greater than 2.22 From the filtered data for
the rest of companies, we construct three factors: size
(SMB: small minus big), value (HML: high minus low)
and momentum (MOM).
The returns on the style factors are weighed to the
capitalization of the companies in each portfolio. Specifi-
cally, to construct the size and value factors we divide
companies into big and small using the median capitali-
zation firm. The two groups are further divided into high,
medium, and low, book to market using the third and
the seventh decile breakpoints of firms' book to market
value. These style portfolios are constructed and
rebalanced at the end of June every year. As a result, we
establish six portfolios: small low book to market (SL),
small-medium book to market (SM), small high book to
market (SH), big low book to market (BL), big medium
book to market (BM), and big high book to market (BH).
The size style factor (small-minus-big SMB) is then gen-
erated by subtracting the average value-weighted returns
of the big portfolios (BL, BM, BH) from the average
returns of the small portfolios (SL, SM, SH). Similarly,
the HML style factor is computed by offsetting returns of
the average of the two value portfolios (SL, BL) and the
two growth portfolios (SH, BH).
A similar procedure is adopted to build the momen-
tum style factor: we form three momentum portfolios
that is, momentum winner (high returns, W), average
(normal returns, A) and loser (low or negative returns, L)
portfolios. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly on
the basis of the previous year's performance of compa-
nies. The WML factor is then calculated as the difference
between the averages of the two winner portfolios (SW,
BW) and the two loser portfolios (SL, BL).
5 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Table 1, we present summary statistics of the CSAD
and the regional Fama–French–Carhart style factors, The
Saudi market returns are marginally negative during the
sample period. Moreover, the average returns of investing
in the factor portfolios are typically slightly negative with
the exception of SMB strategy. The SMB portfolio has
positive average returns that are significant at 1% critical
t-values. The MOM strategy is the riskiest with the largest
standard deviation and range of returns among all fac-
tors. While the SMB strategy is the lowest risk with a nar-
row range of returns.
Figure 1 compares the performance of $1 invested in
each of the factor portfolios. As can be seen in the figure,
a $1 dollar invested in the SMB portfolio has ended with
a value of around $3.5, while a $1 invested in the market
has lost almost half of its value at the end of the sample
period in our work. The investments in the HML and the
MOM portfolios are also underperforming. The invest-
ment in the MOM has lost more than half of its value
and the investment in the HML has lost almost all of its
value at the end of the sample. This indicates that the
most ubiquitous anomalies that is, value and momentum
factors are out of favour in the GCC region. For the fact
that the returns on the style factors are capitalized
weighted, this also applies to the Saudi market and shows
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the increased information asymmetry whether that
comes from company books or market trends,
respectively.
Table 1 shows that the Saudi equities' daily average
dispersion around the market is within the range
reported in the literature (around 1.4%).23 The CSAD
ranges from around zero to 13.2%. This shows that in cer-
tain days movement around the market shrinks signifi-
cantly and potentially Saudi investors could be herding.
The rest of the statistics indicate that the CSAD is posi-
tively skewed and leptokurtic and therefore the null
hypothesis of normality is rejected by the Jarque–Bera
statistics.
To check the dynamics of dispersion across time, Fig-
ure 1 plots a time series of the CSAD during the sample
period of our study. It also plots the average of the CSAD
to help create a point of reference. Figure 1 shows disper-
sions around the market are high and above average in
the period that precedes the GFC from 2005 to 2008. Fol-
lowing 2008, dispersion starts to shrink and company
equities tend to move closely with the market consensus
(Figure 2). Most of the days after 2009 the CSAD is below
its average and, therefore, we expect herding to be signifi-
cant during this period.
To see how dispersion moves with market returns,
Figure 3 scatters the CSAD against market returns. It
shows that dispersion increases with market returns,
albeit at a decreasing rate. The concavity of the scattered
diagram is clear and hence, we expect to find significant
negative non-linearity and herding behaviour in the
Saudi market.
We proceed to test formally for significant herding by
regressing CSAD on market absolute returns and squared
market returns. The herding test results are presented in
Table 2. Every Panel of Table 2 corresponds to a particu-
lar sample period and we run three regressions in each
panel. The first regression includes all days and all mar-
ket conditions (results are in the “all markets” row).
Then we include in the regression a dummy for a bull
and a bear market days and run two additional regres-
sions.24 The results of the regression that run over
upmarket dummy are presented in the “up-market” row,
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics: Factors and cross section absolute deviation
Sample mean SE t-statistic (mean = 0) Skewness Kurtosis (excess) Jarque–Bera Minimum Maximum
CSAD 0.01463 0.01012 89.5 3.33 21.02 77,958.3 0.000 0.132
Market factor −0.000002 0.0152 −0.0078 −0.642 12.7 26,235.3 −0.116 0.162
SMB factor 0.000353 0.00702 3.11 0.999 29.17 137,036 −0.072 0.114
HML factor −0.001023 0.010703 −5.92 −2.633 31.9 167,504 −0.179 0.0682
MOM factor −0.000151 0.010879 −0.858 1.277 83.9 1,131,003 −0.144 0.243
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on the cross-sectional absolute deviation measure to proxy equity market herding. It is esti-
mated using the following expression: CSADt = 1N
PN
i=1
jRi,t−Rm,t j . We also provide summary statistics on the market factor for the Saudi
equity market and regional Fama–French–Carhart factors which are constructed using stocks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
markets. These factors are size factor (SMB), value factor (HML) and momentum factor (MOM).
FIGURE 1 The growth of a 1 USD invested in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) factor portfolios (2005–2019) [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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while the results of regressions run over down market
dummy are presented in the “down-market” row.
Panel A shows the loadings when the regressions are
run over the full sample (2005 to 2019). These results
show that the linear parameter of absolute market return
is positive while the parameter associated with squared
market returns is negative and significant. This indicates
that there was significant herding in Saudi equities dur-
ing the full sample period. Hence, our results are in line
with the evidence for Saudi market reported by Balcilar
et al. (2013, 2014), Rahman et al. (2015), and Balcilar
et al. (2017).
These results continue through all subsamples except
for the sample that directly precedes the GFC (See Panel
B). In this sample, the relationship between cross devia-
tion and market returns is non- linear and negative, but
insignificant, reflecting weak cascades in the market.
This is surprising as the sample period covers the Saudi
market rally in 2005 and 2006 and the crash that follows
in December 2006.25 The oil price during this period was
increasing and the flow of funds found its way through
retail investors to equities, and therefore share prices had
decoupled from their fundamental value in a classic
example of a bubble which busted later. Hence, herding
is expected in both the up and the down markets during
this period.
However, as Panel B of Table 2 shows, there is strong
and significant herding behaviour only in the downturn
of the market while unexpectedly no significant cascades
are found in the upmarket. To examine this in detail we
regressed using a sample that contained only 2005 and
2006 and we find significant herding even in the upmar-
ket as expected.26
The parameters associated with the down-market
regressions are negative and significant during the 2005
to 2008 and the 2008 to 2010 samples. This indicates that
FIGURE 2 CSAD time series variation (2005–2019). Notes: black points are the CSAD over time, and the blue line is the average of
CSAD [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3 Scatter plot against the market factor
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herding is more likely in market falls for settings of Saudi
equity market type. However, in the period that follows,
extending from 2010 to 2019, the Saudi market tends to
herd more in a market rally rather than in a market fall
as can be seen from the parameters reported in Panel D.
The parameter loadings clearly show that the shrink-
age in the dispersion measure is more intense and signifi-
cant in bearish markets. The parameters linked to
squared returns indicate that for every unit change in
market squared returns, the dispersion decreases by
around 2.5% in a down market, but only by 0.5% in an
upmarket. These results are not fully replicated in all
subsamples, as pointed out by Panels B and C of Table 2.
In the period from 2010 to 2019, herding is stronger in
the up markets compared to the down markets. Hence,
we may conclude that while herding, in general, is stron-
ger and more significant when the market falls, there are
periods when the market cascades in a rally are promi-
nent as well. These results are generally in line with the
literature that finds that herding is more pronounced in a
crisis and down markets than it is in an upmarket.
As mentioned before, results based on CSAD do not
distinguish between co-movement due to ignoring indi-
vidual information (herding) or co-movement that stems
from following a particular investment style and/or
having the same reactions to information. We follow
Galariotis et al. (2015) and term the first co-movement as
non-fundamental herding and the second as
fundamental.
Table 3 displays result when we decompose the com-
puted CSAD into CSADFUND, t and CSADNONFUND, t, as
determined by Equation (5) and the following relations.
We regress both the fundamental and non-fundamental
CSADs on absolute returns and squared returns. Panel A
of Table 3 shows that the parameter associated with
squared returns is still negative and significant. This
shows that even when the shrinkage in dispersion
accounts for the styles in the CSAD measure, there is still
evidence of negative non-linearity between cross-sec-
tional absolute dispersion and squared returns. Hence
the shrinkage of dispersion in the Saudi equities is more
likely to be linked to the herding behaviour of investors
rather than to investors' similar styles or reactions to the
same information disclosure. In Panels B, C and D, we
regress over various time periods. In all the panels of
Table 3, the parameters on squared market returns are
negative and significant using the non-fundamen-
tal CSAD.
With the fundamental CSAD this is only found in
panel B that is, the period that precedes the GFC. It
TABLE 2 Herding test results
β0 t-statistics β1 t-statistics β2 t-statistics R
2
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
In all markets 0.0097 25.92 0.634 8.46 −3.71 −2.54 0.264
Up market 0.0109 49.69 0.415 14.97 −0.557 −0.859 0.237
Down market 0.0104 41.55 0.498 13.77 −2.558 −3.845 0.252
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
In all markets 0.017 18.41 0.545 4.92 −2.719 −1.610 0.146
Up market 0.0195 26.92 0.332 6.68 0.184 0.356 0.129
Down market 0.0185 23.40 0.464 7.075 −2.870 −2.740 0.149
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
In all markets 0.00936 23.855 0.622 11.500 −5.083 −4.838 0.361
Up market 0.0112 25.35 0.311 6.20 −0.971 −0.616 0.28
Down market 0.0108 21.12 0.368 5.97 −1.89 −1.95 0.301
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
In all markets 0.0084 55.337 0.488 17.186 −3.165 −4.906 0.360
Up market 0.0088 63.87 0.399 18.26 −2.81 −4.35 0.359
Down market 0.009 48.75 0.351 10.90 0.115 0.151 0.343
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the model specification in Equation (2): CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + et . This specification
retains both fundamental and non-fundamental components in the CSAD for the Saudi equity market herding and provides estimates for lin-
ear and non-linear herding parameters β1and β2, respectively. This specification is estimated for full sample in panel A, for 2005–2008 in
panel B, for period 2008–2010 (Global Financial Crisis period) in panel C and for the post-crisis period in panel D. The adjacent columns on
the right side of each regression estimate provide t-statistics.
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seems that it is only during the 2005 to 2008 period that
investors may have herded as a result of following similar
investment styles and/or responding to fundamentals.
For the rest of the periods, herding of equity returns
observed is not spurious and it is not induced by inves-
tors' styles. This indicates that most of the non-linear neg-
ative relation that is found between dispersion and
market returns stems from investors ignoring their infor-
mation and following the market. Overall, our results
point to the fact that there is cascading behaviour in
Saudi equities especially when we filter out the funda-
mental part of CSAD.27
Table 4 presents the influence of oil volatility on the
herding of Saudi equities. In columns two and four, we
display the non-linear parameter of the CSAD associated
with the oil market and in columns three and five we
show its t-statistics.28 We run three regressions: the first
regresses the full CSAD on oil volatility (the “all devia-
tion” row) and the second regresses the non-fundamental
CSAD on oil volatility (the “non-fundamental” row) and
finally the third regresses the fundamental CSAD on oil
volatility (the “fundamental” row).
The parameters in columns two and four show that
the parameters are largely positive and insignificant
when oil volatility is estimated unconditionally. This is
true in all investigated samples and, therefore, we con-
clude that there is no evidence of interaction between
herding in the Saudi market and the volatility of the oil
market. The results using the non-fundamental CSAD
are not different.. Similarly, the results of the fundamen-
tal CSAD indicate that there is no style or fundamental
herding in the Saudi equities that results from changes in
oil market uncertainty. The results with conditional mar-
ket volatility estimates, that is, column four of the Table 4,
only endorses our general conclusion that oil market vol-
atility is unrelated with herding in the Saudi equities and
this effect is statistically significant across all samples and
herding measures. The estimations in the full period and
period following GFC using fundamental CSAD are the
only exceptions. In sum, these results show that different
CSAD components, and the sum of it as well, in the
Saudi equities are independent of the oil market
variance.
These results contradict Balcilar et al. (2013) who find
that oil is an important factor in affecting market
switching states from herding to not herding and back
again. However, this result conforms Balcilar et al. (2017):
they find that oil returns and volatility do not influence
herding in Saudi equities and that speculation in the oil
market matters.
To check if there is herding around the OPEC meet-
ing days, we run a regression on the multiplication of the
GARCH volatility of oil returns and a dummy that takes
a value of 1 around the OPEC meeting days and zero oth-
erwise. Four windows are investigated: 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 days before and after the OPEC meeting day. The
parameters associated with the multiplicative term with
its t-statistics are reported in Table 5. The coefficients on
TABLE 3 Testing results for fundamental and non-fundamental herding
β0 t-statistics β1 t-statistics β2 t-statistics R
2
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
Non-fund −0.0047 −11.77 0.624 7.61 −3.74 −2.32 0.25
Fund 0.014 368.49 0.0092 1.11 0.029 0.178 0.028
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
Non-fund −0.0059 −6.13 0.508 4.68 −2.48 −1.50 0.13
Fund 0.023 224.22 0.034 3.41 −0.211 −1.898 0.028
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
Non-fund −0.0051 −13.00 0.623 10.90 −5.28 −4.59 0.349
Fund 0.014 264.4 −7.56e-04 −0.068 0.204 0.890 0.045
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
Non-fund −0.0027 −18.70 0.468 19.90 −3.50 −8.12 0.32
Fund 0.011 197.1 0.020 1.29 0.335 0.650 0.054
Notes: This table presents the estimates of the model specification in Equation (6): CSADNONFUND,t = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + et . This specifica-
tion runs the regression on non-fundamental CSAD – purged of the return co-movements arising from Fama–French–Carhart factors. We
replicate the estimation of this regression using fundamental CSAD where we replace non-fundamental CSAD with fundamental CSAD as
the dependent variable in Equation (6). The estimates for linear and non-linear herding parameters β1and β2, respectively, are provided and
adjacent columns to regression estimates populate respective t-statistics. This specification is estimated for full sample in panel A, for 2005–
2008 in panel B, for period 2008–2010 (Global Financial Crisis period) in panel C and for the post-crisis period in panel D.
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the conditional oil volatility during the OPEC meeting
windows are insignificant and hence we conclude that oil
volatility, whether estimated conditionally or uncondi-
tionally, is unrelated to herding – either of fundamental
and the non-fundamental parts – in the Saudi equities.
This result appears to be valid for varying time periods
that extend from 1 day to 1 week before and after the
OPEC conference meeting day. The result is also uniform
across all sub-samples.
Table 6 presents the effect of the OPEC announce-
ments on the Saudi equity herding, specifically these
results correspond to Equation (4) for total CSAD and its
two components. Column 8 and Column 9 display the
coefficient β3 on the interactive variable, accounting for
OPEC meeting days and squared market returns, and it's
associate t statistics. The regression estimates on the
interactive term are significant for non-fundamental
herding during the GFC period. For the rest of the
periods, this effect is insignificantly estimated. However,
we note that sign on the interactive term is economically
meaningful in the full sample and the sample preceding
GFC as well. The only exception is the sample covering
the period of 2010–2019. This applies to unfiltered,
fundamental and non-fundamental herding in the Saudi
equities.
One explanation for these results could be that the
Saudi market is sensitive OPEC news/declarations
regarding the prospects of oil price discovery and global
supply during the heightened stress periods such as GFC
of 2008–2010. Since 2008, Saudi equities have dropped by
more than 50%, as the country is mainly dependent on
oil, and Saudi equity herding oil news sensitivity to miti-
gate ambiguity in the GFC. The different quotas and
energy policies of the OPEC members may have intro-
duced further ambiguities regarding potential outcomes
and information asymmetries from OPEC meetings. The
equity market stress and the increased sensitivity to oil
news coupled with misinformation and ambiguity of
OPEC meeting outcomes during this period may have led
to herding in the Saudi equities. Essentially, the OPEC
meetings function as a signalling mechanism in the Saudi
market herding during global crises or perhaps in periods
when global supply uncertainties are large.
On the contrary, over the 2005–2008 period oil
demand and oil prices were high and except for the crash
in late 2006, the Saudi equity market had not been
TABLE 4 Volatility spillovers from the oil market testing result
β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
All deviations 0.1017 1.135 0.771 3.61
Non-fund 0.0986 1.10 0.824 3.93
Fund 0.0026 0.258 −0.053 −1.70
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
All deviations 0.203 0.222 12.06 3.31
Non-fund 0.231 0.255 11.24 3.11
Fund −0.048 −0.418 0.715 1.26
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
All deviations 0.341 2.85 2.23 10.26
Non-fund 0.327 2.794 2.19 10.19
Fund 0.013 1.20 0.036 1.03
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
All deviations 0.173 1.31 0.621 2.55
Non-fund 0.179 1.61 0.928 3.92
Fund −0.007 −0.162 −0.307 −3.68
Notes: This table presents the estimates from the regression Equation (3) using CSAD inclusive of fundamental and non-fundamental devia-
tions and from Equation (7) using non-fundamental CSAD – purging the return co-movements arising from Fama–French–Carhart system-
atic GCC factors, respectively. For completeness, these regressions are also fitted using CSADFUND, t. The β3 in the second column of the
table is on squared oil market return that is, R2o,t (Equations (3) and (7)) and β3 in the fourth column of the table is oil market volatility esti-
mated from GARCH (1,1) model that we notate by σ̂2o,t [Equations (3) and (7)]. These specifications are estimated for full sample in panel A,
for 2005–2008 in panel B, for period 2008–2010 (Global Financial Crisis period) in panel C and for the post-crisis period in panel D. The adja-
cent columns on the right side of each regression estimate provide t-statistics.
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stressed during the period. Between 2005 and 2008 global
oil production was almost equivalent to global oil con-
sumption and any disruption to supplies or changes in
demand would have created short term shortages and
would have increased oil price volatility. Under these
conditions, oil-producing countries have a consolidated
objective of stabilizing the oil market and the outcome of
OPEC meetings, though uncertain, would have had a big
influence on the oil market. However, as shown by our
results, the increasing price pressures do not bring cas-
cades in the Saudi equities. This is probably because
when the equity market is not distressed, and oil prices
are relatively high, market participants are less interested
in oil news and OPEC meetings.
Surprisingly, there is fundamental herding in Saudi
equities on the days in which the OPEC conference meet-
ings are held but only during the period from 2008 to
2010. These results are significant at the 10% significance
level. Hence, the investors in the Saudi market follow the
investment styles on these days. This contributes and
enforces the overall herding observed during the GFC.
For the rest of the period, the style investments are less
pronounced and the majority of the herding originates
from non-fundamental investment decisions.
To see whether the validity of these results persists
around the OPEC meeting days. We repeat our analysis
using four windows extending from 1 to 5 days before
and after the conference day. Specifically, we insert 1 in
the time series on “n” days before and “n” days after the
event where n assumes values from 1 to 5. Table 7 shows
the results regarding the significance of the herding
parameter that is associated with the squared market
returns around OPEC event windows. The reported
results reinforce our earlier finding that herding is signifi-
cant during the global financial crisis period from 2008–
2010: the non-fundamental CSAD is significantly
influenced by the interaction term in Equation (4) in all
the event windows. However, these results show that the
effect of the interactive term that is, OPEC meeting and
squared market returns also results in herding in the
non-fundamental component during the post-GFC sam-
ple period, see panel D in Table 7. For the rest of the
periods herding is insignificant. There is no evidence of
fundamental herding around the OPEC meetings: the
TABLE 5 Volatility spillovers from the oil market on and around the OPEC meeting testing results
[−1d to +1d] [−2d to +2d] [−3d to +3d] [−4d to +4d] [−5d to +5d]
β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
All deviations 1.391 0.943 1.265 1.31 1.400 1.79 1.460 2.01 1.300 1.96
Non-fund 1.403 0.902 1.31 1.321 1.39 1.74 1.44 1.97 1.271 1.90
Fund −0.015 −0.118 −0.051 −0.603 0.0017 0.025 0.0097 0.154 0.0265 0.464
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
All deviations −4.49 −0.81 −2.73 −0.658 −2.095 −0.526 −0.484 −0.136 0.250 0.079
Non-fund −4.06 −0.75 −1.90 −0.462 −1.54 −0.391 −0.239 −0.068 0.357 0.114
Fund −0.480 −0.659 −0.885 −1.537 −0.600 −1.266 −0.293 −0.589 −0.158 −0.350
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
All deviations 1.18 1.04 0.807 1.17 0.930 1.80 0.91 1.74 0.66 1.30
Non-fund 1.03 0.871 0.675 0.96 0.766 1.45 0.82 1.63 0.549 1.12
Fund 0.14 0.730 0.131 1.085 0.163 1.96 0.092 1.016 0.111 1.50
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
All deviations 1.47 1.14 1.06 0.99 0.885 1.06 0.264 0.37 −0.038 −0.063
Non-fund 0.99 0.85 0.93 0.98 0.835 1.081 0.361 0.55 0.095 0.167
Fund 0.48 1.08 0.12 0.34 0.049 0.188 −0.097 −0.45 −0.13 −0.669
Notes: This table presents the estimates from variants of the regression Equation (4a), using CSAD inclusive of fundamental and non-funda-
mental deviations, and 8a using non-fundamental CSAD – purging the return co-movements arising from Fama–French–Carhart systematic
GCC regional factors. For completeness, these regressions are also fitted using CSADFUND, t. The β3 estimates in the second, fourth, sixth,
eighth and tenth columns of the table are on contemporaneous fitted oil volatility, instead of squared oil market returns, that is given by
GARCH(1,1) model, for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 days before and after the OPEC meeting day. These specifications are estimated for full sample in
panel A, for 2005–2008 in panel B, for period 2008–2010 (global financial crisis period) in panel C and for the post-crisis period in panel D.
The adjacent columns on the right side of each regression estimate provide t-statistics.
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significant coefficients on the interaction variable are esti-
mated with an opposite sign to what is expected. For
example, 4-day event window in the period preceding
GFC, 3-day event window during GFC, and all event win-
dows in the period following GFC that is, panel D. Only
sign of fundamental herding is found in a 2-day event win-
dow in the period preceding GFC (see Panel B of Table 7).
Hence, we conclude that most of the herding
observed in Saudi equities is coming from non-funda-
mental sources and that the contribution of following of
similar investment styles (and assuming similar factors)
is sporadic and mostly implies otherwise. Furthermore,
herding is independent of the oil market volatility, but
we find robust evidence of non-fundamental herding on
and around the OPEC conference meeting days. The
non-fundamental herding is also found after the GFC
period when assessing the impact of OPEC meetings
using several event windows around the OPEC meetings.
6 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the herding behaviour in the
Saudi equity market. The main tests include analyzing
the influence of oil market volatility and the effect of
OPEC meetings on herding behaviour in the Saudi equity
market. The investigation covers various periods between
2005 and 2019. In particular, we look into the pre- and
post-financial crisis samples along with the GFC period
(2008–2010).
Unlike previous studies, we draw our herding infer-
ence by accounting for potential spurious herding that
may arise when investors have the same strategies or
responses to fundamental information. Before detecting
any non-linearity of the cross-sectional dispersion with
average squared returns, we covary dispersion with style
and only use the rest of dispersions to infer. For this pur-
pose, we construct four investment styles that are popular
in the finance literature: market-oriented, value, growth
and small style investing.
Our results indicate significant herding behaviour in
Saudi equities that is independent of oil volatility but not
of OPEC conference meetings. Equities herded on and
around the days of OPEC meeting, but only during the
GFC period and this disappears with the start of global
recovery in 2010. However, our results show that the sep-
aration of non-fundamental herding from the total
TABLE 6 Herding on the OPEC conference meeting day testing results
β0 t-statistics β1 t-statistics β2 t-statistics β3 t-statistics R
2
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
All deviations 0.00974 25.8 0.636 8.46 −3.73 −2.55 −3.85 −0.698 0.264
Non-fund −0.0047 −11.77 0.626 7.62 −3.76 −2.33 −3.84 −0.643 0.253
Fund 0.014 368.0 0.0092 1.116 0.029 0.178 −0.0067 −0.012 0.028
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
All deviations 0.0178 18.3 0.55 4.98 −2.795 −1.642 −8.29 −1.46 0.149
Non-fund −0.0059 −6.17 0.518 4.74 −2.55 −1.54 −7.94 −1.25 0.133
Fund 0.023 223.6 0.035 3.42 −0.21 −1.91 −0.33 −0.42 0.028
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
All deviations 0.0093 23.89 0.624 11.52 −5.11 −4.86 −18.01 −4.56 0.362
Non-fund −0.0051 −13.0 0.625 10.92 −5.31 −4.60 −15.57 −4.18 0.34
Fund 0.014 264.7 −4.8e-04 −0.043 0.20 0.87 −2.43 −1.82 0.046
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
All deviations 0.0084 55.3 0.487 17.11 −3.15 −4.89 3.28 1.95 0.360
Non-fund −0.0027 −18.65 0.467 19.8 −3.49 −8.11 1.42 1.63 0.32
Fund 0.0111 197.5 0.020 1.25 0.342 0.663 1.85 1.76 0.055
Notes: This table presents the estimates from the regression Equation (4) using CSAD inclusive of fundamental and non-fundamental devia-
tions and from Equation (8) using non-fundamental CSAD – purging the return co-movements arising from Fama–French–Carhart system-
atic GCC regional factors, respectively. For completeness, these regressions are also fitted using CSADFUND, t. The β2 and β3 in the fifth and
seventh columns of the table are on squared market returns that is, R2m,t and on the OPEC meeting dummy variable interacted with the
squared market return that is, DUMtR2m,t . This specification is estimated for full sample in panel A, for 2005–2008 in panel B, for period
2008–2010 (Global Financial Crisis period) in panel C and for the post-crisis period in panel D. The adjacent columns on the right side of
each regression estimate provide t-statistics.
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herding is illuminating: around the OPEC meeting days,
the non-fundamental herding is present even in the post
of the GFC period. These results inform existing research
on behavioural decision biases for equity markets in nat-
ural resource-abundant countries as well as emerging
equity markets.
Our results indicate that Saudi equity herding mainly
is non-fundamental and it originates from ignoring own
information and imitating other investors. The evidence
that herding results from following similar investment
styles or responding to similar fundamental factors
are weak.
These findings are important for policymakers as
there is room for improving the quality of the Saudi mar-
ket and reducing its volatility by disclosing more infor-
mation and educating retail investors. The results are
also important for active funds as our results reveal that
there are exploitable inefficiencies and room to improve
performance by investing in Saudi equities, particularly
around the OPEC conference meetings when global
uncertainty is high such as GFC 2008–09.
The absence of influence of oil volatility on the
herding of equity markets in oil-producing countries has
important implications for the asset allocation decision,
portfolio hedging and diversification. Nonetheless, the
key implication of our work is that subjective trading and
market inefficiencies for a market that underlies changes
in oil prices is strongly and persistently related to the
decisions undertaken at OPEC during stressed global
times.
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In reference to the “Expects data” policy of the journal, I
note that the datasets used in the work are from licensed
data portal i.e. DataStream that restricts us from sharing
data. In this case sharing data will compromise legal
requirements and thus cannot be shared. Nonetheless,
appropriate acknowledgements are provided in the data
sections to know from where to source the same datasets.
However, the data that support the findings of this study
are available from DataStream - a licensed third-party
database. Restrictions apply to the availability of these
TABLE 7 Herding around the OPEC conference meeting testing results: Various time windows
[−1d to +1d] [−2d to +2d] [−3d to +3d] [−4d to +4d] [−5d to +5d]
β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics β3 t-statistics
Panel A: 2005 to 2019
All deviations −1.53 −0.397 −0.14530 −0.10901 0.74018 0.43761 −0.01428 −0.01129 0.11764 0.09678
Non-fund −1.69 −0.419 −0.23266 −0.17311 0.62451 0.35882 −0.24873 −0.18813 −0.05572 −0.04372
Fund 0.166 0.572 0.08850 0.65298 0.11723 0.94668 0.23584 2.13679 0.17487 1.52064
Panel B: 2005 to 2008
All deviations −4.08 −0.675 −1.57763 −0.99286 −0.91948 −0.48859 −1.43002 −1.01891 −1.35370 −0.99729
Non-fund −4.18 −0.700 −1.23796 −0.79237 −0.74505 −0.40258 −1.47762 −1.04464 −1.36683 −0.99957
Fund 0.110 0.178 −0.33337 −1.87827 −0.16630 −0.87955 0.05531 0.29837 0.02142 0.12286
Panel C: 2008 to 2010
All deviations −2.18 −1.58 −2.15894 −1.73295 −1.40950 −0.96503 −2.94724 −2.84828 −3.05781 −3.02599
Non-fund −2.93 −2.39 −2.80064 −2.46772 −2.33070 −1.64605 −3.54274 −3.64092 −3.41042 −3.71385
Fund 0.751 1.53 0.64170 1.22411 0.92120 2.91587 0.59550 1.30292 0.35261 0.74239
Panel D: 2010 to 2019
All deviations 0.055 0.059 −0.25604 −0.31385 −0.39330 −0.50337 −0.82942 −0.94597 −0.99002 −1.05977
Non-fund −1.24 −1.65 −1.56536 −2.11690 −1.91475 −2.40013 −2.25505 −2.31036 −2.35250 −2.31308
Fund 1.30 3.35 1.30932 3.37033 1.52145 3.00199 1.42563 3.18378 1.36248 3.25783
Notes: This table presents the estimates from the regression Equation (4) using CSAD inclusive of fundamental and non-fundamental devia-
tions and from Equation (8) using non-fundamental CSAD – purging the return co-movements arising from Fama–French–Carhart system-
atic GCC regional factors, respectively. For completeness, these regressions are also fitted using CSADFUND, t. The β3 estimates in the second,
fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth columns of the table are on the interaction term of OPEC dummy that value of 1 during the event window
and squared market return. The event windows are 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 days before and after the OPEC meeting day. This specification is esti-
mated for full sample in panel A, for 2005–2008 in panel B, for period 2008–2010 (Global Financial Crisis period) in panel C and for the post-
crisis period in panel D. The adjacent columns on the right side of each regression estimate provide t-statistics.
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data, which were used under license for this study. Data




1 This conforms nicely with the empirical literature that finds a
unidirectional information spillover from the US to numerous
international equity markets.
2 For expositional convenience, we interchangeably use herding
behavior, herding tendency or simply herding to imply the same.
3 Government spending constitutes around 50% of aggregate
spending.
4 The oil price had jumped from $47 in July to $67 in August 1990
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
5 For details see here: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil/oil-
steadies-on-opec-cuts-but-oversupply-fears-persist-idUSKCN1TV119.
6 For more on oil equity linkages see Maghyereh and Al-
Kandari (2006), Park and Ratti (2008), Filis, Degiannakis, and
Floros (2011), Arouri and Nguyen (2010), Awartani and
Maghyereh (2013), Bouri, Awartani, and Maghyereh (2016),
Maghyereh and Awartani (2016), Maghyereh, Awartani, and
Bouri (2016), Awartani, Javed, Maghyereh, and Virk (2018) and
references therein. The increase in oil prices increases costs and
reduces company cash flows and values. However, if the rise is
due to the rise in global demand for oil, then it is associated with
higher equity prices. Oil price volatility also influences share
values in energy companies.
7 Historically Saudi equity market has been a frontier market, how-
ever, as per the MSCI 2018 market classification review its status
is elevated to emerging market status from June 2019.
8 See for instance, Christie and Huang (1995), Chang, Cheng, and
Khorana (2000), Caporale, Economou, and Philippas (2008),
Gleason, Lee, and Mathur (2003), Hwang and Salmon (2004), and
Demirer and Kutan (2006).
9 The same method is used by Galariotis et al. (2015). The number
of companies in Saudi Arabia are not large enough to get diversi-
fied portfolios to construct reliable estimate of style returns.
Therefore, we pooled all companies in the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries, which is the economic block that Saudi Arabia
belongs to, for the purpose of factor computations. All companies
within the block live under similar environment and are subject
to similar risks and regulations. This has increased the number of
companies by three-folds and has improved style returns
measurement.
10 There are also the studies by Balcilar et al. (2014, 2017), Youssef
and Mokni (2018), and Chaffai and Medhioub (2018).
11 The results are not different when we use the cross- sectional
average of the N company returns instead of market returns. The
market returns are computed as the continuously compounded
returns of the broad market index.
12 This measure is built on the basis of a zero beta CAPM model. In
this model it can be shown that the expected CSAD is the market
returns above the zero beta returns multiplied by the difference
between the beta of individual companies and the beta of the
equally weighted market portfolio of the N companies. Hence,
the measure should increase linearly with market returns.
13 In the language of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) this is ter-
med as spurious herding and in the language of Galariotis
et al. (2015) it is termed as fundamental herding. We use both
terms throughout the paper to describe the part of the measure
which is not related to our measure for herding.
14 The Saudi Arabian Monetray Authority (SAMA) repo rate is used
to proxy the risk free rate.
15 More details about the construction of these factors can be found
in the next section.
16 We have also estimated another version of Equation (8) that
reads as CSADt = β0 + β1 Rm,tj j+ β2R2m,t + β3DUMt Rm,tj j
+ β4DUMtR
2
m,t + et but the results are not any different. There-
fore, we keep the simpler specification in the exposition.
17 The study uses data for all active, dead and suspended companies
to eliminate any potential survivorship bias.
18 The name of the Saudi broad market index is the Tadawul all-
share index. Its symbol in Datastream is TDWTASI.
19 The Arab Spring refers to the political change of regimes by
national revolutions in the Middle East which started in Tunis
by the end of 2010.
20 The number of companies listed in the Saudi market is only 175,
while the number of companies listed in the financial markets of
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is 623. Therefore, we opt
to compute regional factors to get more accurate estimates of fac-
tor returns. Since all companies run in the same economic block
these factors are expected to be informative for all countries
including Saudi Arabia.
21 The number of listed companies in the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cils countries is 175 in Saudi Arabia, 150 in Oman, 68 in Kuwait,
47 in Bahrain, 46 Qatar, 69 in Dubai, and 68 in Abu Dhabi.
22 We follow Ince and Porter (2006) and Griffin, Kelly, and Nar-
dari (2010) in their industry codes to remove non-equity securi-
ties and to filter the equity data.
23 The average daily reported CSAD in similar studies ranges from
0.5 to 3%. See Rahman et al. (2015) and Gavriilidis, Kallinterakis,
and Tsalavoutas (2016) as they report CSAD values in a range of
countries. If the Saudi daily dispersion is transposed to monthly
using the square root rule then it will translate to 6.5%, which is
comparable to the monthly US equity return dispersion reported
by Christie and Huang (1995).
24 The bull and bear days are separated based on the Saudi market
index returns.
25 By January 2007 the Saudi market index lost more than half of
its value since its all- time high recorded in February 2006.
26 Results for these two years are not displayed, but they are avail-
able from the authors upon request.
27 The 2005 and 2006 regressions show significant herding. These
are available upon request.
28 The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on an oil volatility that
is measured using squares returns. The results in columns 4 and
5 are based on an oil volatility that is measured by a GARCH
(1,1) process.
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